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Renate PlatzOder participated in PrepCom and did not actively participate in the consultations until very recently. Second, among the developing countries there is a great deal of hope that the Convention will enter into force as adopted in 1982, so that the Convention could only be changed in accordance with its amendment procedures. Third, there are hardly any precedents concerning the problem of changing a multilateral treaty before its entry into force. The last round of the Dialogue took place in New York from 2 to 6 August 1993, which will be followed by an additional meeting from 8 to 12 November 1993, also in New York.
The United States informed the Secretary-General and the participants of the 10th session on 27 and 28 April 1993, that the Clinton administration will take a more active role in the search for a 'widely acceptable Convention'. 1^ At the same time it was said that it would be incorrect to see a fundamental shift in the US policy regarding specific objections towards the deep seabed regime of the Convention, and that a solution to the outstanding problems would require substantial changes, and a legally binding instrument to give effect to them.
As to the time period in which such instrument will have to be negotiated, the following can be said: as long as the requirement of 60 ratifications or accessions 14 is not met, there is no doubt that an extra-treaty solution is possible. Further, the mandate for the informal consultations conducted by the Secretary-General is unquestionable. But the Convention will enter into force automatically 12 months after the 60th instrument of ratification or accession will have been deposited with the Secretary-General, 15 and consequently the m«nHati» for the Dialogue win no longer have any sound basis. If such a situation arises, additional problems will have to be dealt with.
The Preparatory Commission
The PrepCom was established by Resolution I of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. 16 All States and other entities entitled to become party to the Convention -for example, the European Community -may participate in the work of PrepCom. However, only those which have signed or acceded to the Convention are entitled to participate in the taking of decisions.' 7 The mandate of the PrepCom is defined as follows:
to take all possible measures to ensure the entry into effective operation without undue delay of the Authority and the Tribunal and to make the necessary arrangements for the commencement of their functions. 1 8
The deliberations on the issue of developing 'land-based producer States likely to be affected by deep seabed production' and on the 'Enterprise', the operating arm of the Authority/ 1 were equally conservative. Another chance for progressive development of the deep seabed regime of the Convention was offered in Article 158, paragraph 3, which provided for the establishment of such subsidiary organs of the Authority as may be found necessary. In this context, a Finance Committee to assist and advise die Authority was proposed by Member States of the European Community and Japan in 1984.22 it was suggested that this Committee should consist of 15 experts, provided that eight of diem were elected from candidates nominated by the 15 States with the highest contributions to the administrative budget of the Authority. Although the idea to establish a Finance Committee was found generally acceptable, the idea to introduce a new category of States to the deep seabed regime consisting of die major fjinmrinl contributors, and to reserve for them the majority of seats, was watered down to the following formulation:
In die election of the members of the Finance Committee, due account shall be taken of the need for equitable geographical distribution and the representation of special interests including, until the Authority shall have sufficient income from sources other than the contributions of States Parties to meet its administrative expenses, the representation of States Parties with the highest contribution to the administrative budget of the Authority .23
In die discussions on die financial implications for States Parties to die Convention with regard to die Authority, a general approach was agreed upon, namely, 'the necessity for economy, and 24 However, the UN Secretariat proposed two models, a 'self-administered' and a 'United Nations-linked' Authority. In the case of the latter, substantial costs would have to be borne by all members of the United Nations whether parties to the Convention or not.
Against this background, the conclusion is sad and simple: the various possibilities offered by die Convention were not used to make it more attractive to those States which had already invested in research, prospecting and exploration of the deep seabed. A somewhat convincing argument was put forward to the effect that negotiations on substantive changes should include die United States. Otherwise, it was feared that compromises agreed upon in PrepCom might not satisfy Washington, and more concessions would have to be made at a later stage or in a different forum.
In addition to the mandate in Resolution I, the PrepCom was entrusted with die task of implementing Resolution II containing the regime for the protection of pioneer investments in deep seabed activities while the Convention is not in force.
In performing such functions, die PrepCom was faced with a number of difficult issues. There was, first of all, die question of overlapping claims to deep seabed areas. Resolution n requires that applicants for pioneer investor status must ensure that their claims are free of overlaps. In 1983 and 1984, the Soviet Union, India, France and Japan submitted applications for registration, and a series of problems surfaced. Not only did die French, Japanese and Soviet claims overlap, but claims were also made by so-called 'potential applicants' that had no intention of applying for registration. 2^ Another problem was that die overlaps were so extensive that die chances for die Enterprise to mine were diminished. All these problems were sorted out by four understandings adopted by PrepCom 2^ and several multilateral agreements concluded outside.
PrepCom registered six pioneer investors, China, France, India, Japan, die Soviet Union, and die Eastern European consortium 'Interoceanmetal' which was added to the list contained in Resolution II by the New York Understanding of 1986.
Resolution II specifies five obligations for such pioneer investors: (1) to carry out exploration; (2) to provide training for personnel designated by die Commission; (3) to transfer technology; (4) to make funds available to the Enterprise; and (5) to report periodically to die Commission. Again by means of understandings, these obligations were reduced, 27 and die obligation to become party to die Convention and to apply for approval of a plan of work for exploration and exploitation within six months of die entry into force of the Convention was modified. There was ample time and opportunity to make use of the Conference itself. To this end, quite a few activities were undertaken behind the scene to convince States to resume negotiations on the deep seabed regime. For example, the five-week meeting of the Drafting Committee and its six language groups in Geneva would have offered an ideal opportunity for informal talks. But on 9 July 1982, President Reagan announced that the United States would not sign the Convention because of problems concerning the deep seabed regime. 31 The decision by the Reagan administration to refrain from participating in 'rescue-operations' for the Convention and PrepCom activities was heavily criticized by the community of law of the sea academics as well as by statesmen and diplomats all over the world. However, little is known about the real issues at stake from the perspective of major maritime powers. The vice-chairman of the delegation of the former Soviet Union to the Conference, Ambassador Igor Kolossovsky, admitted at least that the climate of the Cold War was particularly harmful to the work on the deep seabed regime.
32 During the early years of PrepCom it became quite obvious that the Soviet Union pursued a confrontational policy towards the major Western countries on that issue. 33 In retrospect, one may conclude today that at the dawn of Glasnost and Perestroika the extreme ideologists once again dominated over the more pragmatic thinkers. This situation began to change only in 1986 when a series of practical problems had to be solved prior to the registration of mine sites by PrepCom. This development was instrumental in launching discussions and activities by various institutions and individuals to encourage renewed efforts to save the Convention.
The Law of the Sea Institute at the University of Hawaii was one of the academic fora where some of the issues here discussed were canvassed. 
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In 1991, the question of the role for PrepCom vis-a-vis the Dialogue 42 was-discussed. When it became certain that the United States would not join PrepCom, a different forum had to be found for dealing with the problem of universal acceptability of the Convention. Before the informal consultations were opened in 1992 to all interested States, a linkage between the Dialogue and PrepCom was considered mainly for three reasons. First, to overcome frustration among the majority of States that only a selected group of States was invited to join the Secretary-General in his efforts. Second, to acknowledge the work done by PrepCom in relation to the 'hard core issues' of die deep seabed regime; and third, to preserve PrepCom as a back-up forum should die Dialogue fail, or as a venue for discussion and adoption of its results. No linkage was established. PrepCom was urged to conclude its work, and it could be argued that die activities outside PrepCom sucked the blood out of it But die point could also be made that PrepCom dug its own grave because there was too little chance that die principal concerns of industrialized countries which went beyond die solving of practical problems could be accommodated. The 'Resolution of Reith' emerged from a gathering in a picturesque Tyrolese village where a few old hands meet every so often to discuss rising issues of international law. After much heated debate, tbe group reached the conclusion that only a pragmatic approach would have a nigh probability of success, if it were short and simple. Otherwise, any attempt to make the Convention universally acceptable would raise more problems than it would solve. The concept developed by the group is based on four considerations. First, the deep seabed regime should be frozen with the exception of the principles as laid down in Articles 136 to 149. Second, an interim arrangement for the period between the entry into force of the Convention and the beginning of commercial production of deep seabed minerals should be approved by the UN General Assembly and become effective for all States at the same time. Third, once the economic viability and environmental soundness of deep seabed production has been determined by a group of experts, the 'frozen' provisions of the Convention should be adapted in a universally acceptable manner. 4 $ A roundtable discussion was devoted to the question of The Choice of the Right Format*. Some voices spoke against amending the deep seabed regime; it was stated that those provisions of the Convention were non-implementable for some time because no commercial recovery of deep seabed minerals would take place in the immMtintr future. It was also argued that there was little chance of reaching an agreement to confine amendments to the deep seabed regime. It was contended that States would suggest to amend other parts of the Convention, such as the provisions on the exclusive economic zone. With regard to strategy, an opinion was expressed to the effect that one should first discuss substance and then format Others felt that problems of substance can sometimes be overcome by procedural devices. It was also said that a comeback of the United States could be facilitated by suggesting a proper format. Then, a 'gentleman's agreement' was proposed to waive or suspend those provisions which were not relevant at present, and to implement only those which were supported by consent 
Anodwr very active forum is the

Conclusions
The problem of changing the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea before its entry into force is mainly a political one..Two General Assembly resolutions have already identified the essential issues;
... political and economic changes, including particularly a growing reliance on market principles, underscore the need to re-evaluate, in the light of the issues of concern to some States, matters in the regime to be applied to the Area and its resources, and that a productive dialogue on such issues involving all interested parties would facilitate the prospect of universal participation in the Convention, for the benefit of mankind as a whole.
55
If the international community could act on the basis of this position it should be possible to amend the Convention by means of a proper legally binding instrument such as a protocol. As long as the discussions in the Dialogue have not reached that understanding, the efforts undertaken through the informal consultations have to be considered as an attempt to overcome political differences by using legal imagination, and the success of such an operation will depend in the end on 'human factors'. 
